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Political Connection and Firm Value
JAMES S. ANG, DAVID K. DING, AND TIONG YANG THONG∗
We study the effect of political connection (PC) on company value in an en-
vironment where low PC is due to better institutions and not confounded by
favorable social/cultural factors. We find that in Singapore, the only country
that fits this description, PC in general adds little to the value of a company.
However, in industries that are subject to more stringent government regulations,
PC appears to be somewhat important. Robustness checks show that alternative
PC variables give rise to similar results, and the addition of control variables
do not drastically change the findings. Politically connected firms have higher
managerial ownership and tend to be smaller than non-PC firms, rendering them
more susceptible to poorer governance practices. We show that the presence
of politically connected directors somewhat neutralizes such potential negative
effects. PC firms are associated with good governance practices such as nondu-
ality in their chairman and chief executive officer positions and fewer executive
directors.
Keywords: political connection, corporate governance, firm value, Singapore
JEL codes: G32, G34, O53
I. Introduction
While the value of political connection to firms has received considerable
research interest (Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2009; Imai 2006; Khwaja and Mian
2004; Ang and Boyer 2007), the question of whether political connection enhances
firm value has mixed findings.1 When the value of political connection is found
to be high, they are often in countries with higher levels of official corruption.
We do not know whether political connection is as valuable in the absence of
political corruption, the question being, is political corruption a precondition for
political connection to be valuable? To test this hypothesis, we examine the impact
∗James S. Ang is Professor of Finance at the College of Business, Florida State University, USA. David K. Ding is
Professor of Finance at the School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, New Zealand and at the Lee Kong
Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University. Tiong Yang Thong is Lecturer of Finance at the Lee
Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University.
1Examining 47 countries, Faccio (2006) finds a positive relation between political connection and firm value.
Specifically, she finds that political connection is common in countries that are highly corrupt. Goldman, Rocholl,
and So (2009) show positive abnormal stock returns following the announcement of a politically connected individual
nominated to the board. Fan,Wong, and Zhang (2007), however, find a negative relation between politically connected
CEOs and post-IPO performance in the People’s Republic of China.
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of politically connected directors on the value of firms operating in an environment
where the perceived level of corruption is comparatively low.2
Singapore was selected for the study because it is unique among low cor-
ruption countries. Unlike other low corruption countries where the results may
be attributable to shared social and/or cultural factors with neighboring countries,
Singapore has a distinctive need for much stronger institutions as it is surrounded
by countries that are perceived to be inherently more corrupt. For example, the
2010 edition of the global corruption perceptions index released by Transparency
International lists Denmark, New Zealand, and Singapore jointly as the world’s least
corrupt countries. New Zealand’s closest neighbor, Australia, is ranked eighth on
the same index. Denmark, together with neighbors Sweden and Finland, are ranked
within the top five in 2010. By contrast, Singapore’s immediate neighbors in
Southeast Asia include Malaysia (ranked #56), Thailand (ranked #78), Indonesia
(ranked #110), Viet Nam (ranked #116), and the Philippines (ranked #134).
Furthermore, the social and cultural background of Singaporeans, as derived
from their ethnic background, also does not favor low corruption. Of the countries
of ancestral origin among Singapore’s three major ethnic groups (Chinese, Malays,
and Indians), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) ranked #78, Malaysia ranked
#56, and India ranked #87. Thus, even if we find political connection not benefiting
private firms with connections in both Scandinavian countries and Singapore, the
underlying causes are inherently different. Singapore has to rely on having strong
institutions to achieve low corruption, one that is not confounded by social and cul-
tural factors. These unique factors allow for a natural experiment to be conducted on
how institutions may limit the role of political influence in businesses. Specifically,
we examine this issue within the context of post-initial public offering (IPO) firms
in Singapore to show that rent-seeking through politically connected directors is not
viable in countries viewed to be very clean, such as in Singapore, and where the
legal and political institutions are fair, transparent, and effective.3
Previous studies did not specifically investigate low corruption countries nor
did they conclusively argue that the effect of political connection is independent
of corruption. We investigate the value of political connection under a political
regime with low perceived corruption and document that firms operating under
such a political environment benefit little—except for firms in highly regulated
industries—from their political connection. This new finding, in contrast to those
in previous studies that find strong value in political connection under a corrupt
2According to Transparency International, an international nongovernment organization addressing corrup-
tion including but not limited to political corruption, Singapore together with Denmark and New Zealand ranks as
the cleanest country out of 178 in the world in 2010, with a corruption perceptions index of 9.3. Finland and Sweden
complete the top five least corrupt countries that year.
3It has been well documented in the existing literature (e.g., Ritter 1991, Ritter and Welch 2002) that firms
with a higher level of underpricing during an initial public offering (IPO) tend to underperform over the long run.
In the present study, politically connected firms in the sample have a lower, but not statistically significant, level of
underpricing than nonpolitically connected firms.
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political regime, clarifies the role of political corruption and the channel through
which values are created for such firms and/or their managers. A corrupt political
environment increases the probability that firms’ connected politicians are willing
and able to extract rents from the public and competitors on behalf of their firms.
Such an environment also gives politically connected individuals certain incentives,
as they may receive a share of the extracted rents in the form of personal payoffs or
campaign contributions with low perceived personal risks.
Politically connected firms may benefit through easier access to debt financ-
ing, lower taxes, or strongermarket power. Such benefits are usually greater when the
firm operates in a country with a high level of corruption among its officials, low pro-
tection of property rights, a highly interventionist government, or a nondemocratic
government (Faccio 2006). In addition to gaining economic benefits, some firmsmay
appoint politically connected directors for their knowledge and experience with gov-
ernment procedures, their insights into government actions, their ability to enlist the
government for the firm’s interest at the expense of competitors, or to forestall gov-
ernment action inimical to the firm (Agrawal andKnoeber 2001). Goldman, Rocholl,
and So (2009) find that companies connected to the United States (US) Republican
Party experience an increase in value following the Republican Party’s win in the
2000 presidential election, while companies connected to the Democratic Party saw
a stock price plunge. In Singapore, firms may appoint politically connected directors
to their board to signal stronger corporate governance. This argument is in line with
the finding of Ang and Ding (2006) that government-linked companies in Singapore
are associated with stronger corporate governance and higher firm valuations.
Political connection may add value to either the connected firms and/or their
managers. An example is the contrast between Indonesia and the PRC. Managers of
Indonesian firms are often the largest shareholders, where 84.6% of management is
affiliated with the controlling owners (see Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000). The
extant literature highlights evidence from Indonesia where investors view political
connection to the country’s president as valuable, accounting for one-fourth of a
firm’s value and adding 33% to firm value (Fisman 2001). Thus, because managers’
stakes in the firms are large, a substantial share of rent extraction accrues to the firm.
In the PRC, however, the average management ownership of Chinese firms at the
time of IPO is a mere 0.298% (Li et al. 2007) and firms with political connection
underperform their counterparts that have no political connections by 37% over a
3-year post-IPO period (Fan,Wong, and Zhang 2007). This finding is consistent with
the view that managers with a low personal ownership in their firmsmainly divert the
rent extracted frompolitical connection to themselves and the connected politicians.4
4Other forms of political connection related to value reduction include having lower quality political ap-
pointees as managers and running the business as a political bureaucracy. It is also possible that Chinese investors
fail to understand that it takes ownership alignment for rent extracted from political connection to flow to the firm
and not the managers.
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The issue addressed in this article is whether political connection enhances
firm valuation when political corruption is low. Underlying the hypothesis is the
conjecture that significant rent extraction ismade possible only under an environment
of high political corruption. The alternative hypothesis is that political corruption
may not be necessary for politically connected directors to help create value for their
firms. For instance, politically connected directors who are not corrupt may be able
to influence their firm’s governance structure by aligning it with the government’s
policy initiatives, which may lead to higher investor confidence and resultant higher
firm value in some cases.5
Singapore is in a unique situation being the only low corruption country in a
region dominated by high corruption. In contrast, Denmark and New Zealand, which
are jointly ranked with Singapore as the least corrupt, have neighboring countries
that are also low on corruption. Denmark and New Zealand are less suitable for
studying the issue raised here as their environment of political corruption, the
willingness of politicians to abuse their powers, and the likelihood of firms or
managers engaging in political rent extraction, may be related to an unspecified
common factor—their shared social and/or cultural environment with neighboring
countries. Thus, Singapore provides a more ideal natural experiment for our study.6
In this study, we define a company to be politically connected if at least one
member on its board of directors is: (i) a former cabinet minister of the Singapore
government, (ii) a serving or formerMember of Parliament (MP), or (iii) a current or
former senior civil servant of the Singapore government.7 We investigate the relation
between political connection and firm valuation within the context of newly listed
companies during 1998–2006.We employ Tobin’sQ as a proxy for the value of newly
listed firms in Singapore for each of the 3 years after their issuance and compare the
differences in value between companies with and without political connection. We
also explore the relationship between political connection, corporate governance,
and firm value.
The results of this paper show that in a country such as Singapore, where
political corruption is relatively low, political connection adds little to the value or
performance of the company. However, upon further careful investigation, we find
that in certain industries, political connection appears to be more important than in
others. These are industries that tend to be subject to more stringent government
regulation such as electrical and electronic equipment (SIC 36), holding and other
investment offices (SIC 67), general building contractors (SIC 15), food and kindred
5An example is from Ferguson and Voth (2008), who report that firms politically linked to Hitler’s Nazi
Germany outperformed the market by 5%–10%. However, this should be properly viewed as a consequence of the
skewed policy of fascism in favor of a few companies.
6The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in June 2004, indicated in its financial system stability assessment
of Singapore that a competent judiciary is one of the cornerstones of Singapore’s legal system, giving top marks for
the reliability of the country’s legal, supervisory, and institutional framework.
7Currently serving ministers of the government are not permitted to sit on corporate boards. However, no
such restrictions are imposed on MPs and senior civil servants.
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products (SIC 20), and rubber and miscellaneous plastics products (SIC 30). There
is evidence that companies in such industries may find that having directors who
are politically connected could have a positive and significant impact on their firm’s
value. We further examine the characteristics of these firms and find that, among
these firms, those with a politically connected chairman/chief executive officer
(CEO) or senior civil servant on their board benefit the most in terms of a positive
effect on firm value.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
a brief introduction of corporate governance in Singapore. Section III reviews the
prior literature on political connection and develops the hypotheses. The sample data
and research methodology are described in detail in Section IV. Research outcomes
and results are documented in Section V. Section VI summarizes the study and
provides some concluding remarks.
II. Background of Corporate Governance in Singapore
Following loosely the Anglo-American model, Singapore’s corporate gov-
ernance system revolves around capital market controls of managerial behavior
(Prowse 1998). The capital market in Singapore is thin (less than 500 listed compa-
nies were on the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2002, growing to about 800 firms in
2008), and equity is firmly held among a small group of investors including the Gov-
ernment of Singapore, multinational and regional corporations, wealthy individuals,
and entrepreneurial families. Government-linked corporations (GLCs) account for
approximately 24% of the stock market’s total capitalization of $287 billion and
control over a 10th of the country’s economic output (Ang and Ding 2006). There-
fore, any study of corporate governance in Singapore would not be complete without
understanding the role and governance structure of Singapore’s GLCs.
Typically, GLC boards are populated by senior civil servants and political
appointees, making board appointments an oblique method for monitoring or
controlling corporate activities and business practices by the government. The
government-centered corporate governance system can be potentially effective if
strong governance is regarded as keeping with effective industrial policy (Phan and
Yoshikawa 2005). To buttress this view, Ang and Ding (2006) compare the financial
and market performance of GLCs with non-GLCs, where each had a different gov-
ernance structure, the key difference being government ownership. They show that
Singaporean GLCs have higher valuations and better corporate governance than a
control group of non-GLCs. Their results hold even after controlling for firm-specific
characteristics such as profitability, leverage, firm size, and foreign ownership.
GLCs in Singapore are largely corporate investments by Temasek Holdings, a
wholly owned government entity that prides itself for its ability to make investment
decisions strictly on a commercial basis. Temasek’s articulated policy with respect
to GLCs is to play a key monitoring role in commercially viable and financially
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independent companies. Due to Temasek’s stake in GLCs, it is possible that some
politicians are appointed on behalf of Temasek. It may then be argued that these
appointees, in protecting the interests of Temasek, also maximize share value, as
long as: (i) Temasek does not influence the government to show favoritism at the
expense of competitors, and (ii) it is not possible for Temasek or its appointees to
share in the private benefits of control.
There are a few anecdotes to reinforce the view that politically connected
firms in Singapore do not enjoy favoritism from the government. For example, since
April 2007, the postal sector has witnessed the entry of new players in both domestic
and internationalmail services after a 15-yearmonopoly held by SingPost.8 Also, the
corporate tax rate is applied uniformly across all businesses and industries with the
expectation that no firm is specially protected by the government to reap economic
benefits.
III. Literature Review and Hypotheses
Political connection, or the lack thereof, is a double-edged sword; it can either
enhance or jeopardize a firm’s value. In the PRC, Xu, Zhu, and Lin (2002) show that
when political control is curtailed, firm performance improves. This happens when
there is a resulting increase in a firm’s flexibility in labor deployment and in the
enforcement of more effective corporate governance mechanisms. It is recognized,
however, that some political appointees have conflicting objectives, e.g., maximizing
employment or minimizing social costs.
Likewise, politically connected CEOs, instead of being helpful to firm perfor-
mance, may have a deleterious effect. Fan,Wong, and Zhang (2007) report that firms
with politically connected CEOs underperform those without political connection
by 37% when measured by their firms’ 3-year post-IPO stock returns. In addition,
performance measures such as market-to-book value and return on assets of state-
controlled firms are found to be negatively related to the level of state ownership
(Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007). Similarly, evidence from 47 countries shows that
politically connected firms underperform nonpolitically connected firms on an ac-
counting basis, notwithstanding the fact that they are able to derive considerable
benefits from their political connections (Faccio 2006).
One possible explanation for the underperformance of politically connected
firms is that the channeling of resources by politicians toward favored firms can lead
to a distortion of incentives, misallocation of investment, and increase in corrupt
activities (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). On the other hand, with political connection,
a firm may increase in value if it manages to extract unfair economic rents at the
expense of competitors and consumers (e.g., Faccio 2006). However, when all or
more of the increase in firm value is consumed by politicians and their connected
8Lee Hsien Yang, the brother of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, serves as an independent director on
SingPost’s board.
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managers, less of any remaining value would be available to shareholders. This is a
form of agency problem that proper governance structures can help contain.
A subtle point to note is that good governance, which aims to increase share
value, does not equate to good citizenship. It is perfectly consistent for good gover-
nance firms to take advantage of political connection to increase share value under
corrupt regimes.
If political connection were used as a prime determinant of profitability, it
would induce distorted investment decisions (Faccio 2006) and consequently lead
to lower firm value. There is evidence in Indonesia of firms facing difficulties in
building connections with a new government when their patron falls from power,
causing those firms to underperform under the new regime and subsequently to turn
to foreign financing (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006).
On the other hand, politically connected companies may benefit from easier
access to debt financing, lower taxes, and stronger market power (Faccio 2006). For
example, Friedman (1999) reports that bankers are often compelled to extend loans
for projects undertaken by politically connected firms even when they are forecast to
be unprofitable, thus extracting rents from the banks. Such evidence, together with
others (e.g., Johnson et al. 2006, Khwaja and Mian 2004, Sapienza 2004) provide
further support that the discrepancy in the lending behavior of state-owned banks is
affected by the electoral results of the party affiliated with the bank. Such actions
represent a wealth transfer from citizens or consumers to the firm, leading to an
increase in firm value.
Besides easier access to credit, politically connected firms may enjoy other
benefits. Some public officials and politicians may clandestinely sell underprovided
goods and a spectrum of rent-generating advantages to individual firms, often allow-
ing firms to shape the rules of the game to their advantage at considerable social cost
(Hellman, Jones, andKaufmann 2000). Alternatively, directors may be appointed for
their knowledge, experience with government procedures, insights in government
policy, and the ability to persuade the government in favor of the firm’s interest or
forestall governmental action pernicious to the firm (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001).
Imai (2006) shows that powerful business groups strive to directly hold influ-
ential public offices in order to change economic policies to their favor as companies
with political connection are more likely to win a project tender because of the pro-
tection from corrupt politicians or bureaucrats. Thus, the award of government
contracts to companies without basic qualifications, resources, and expertise is, not
surprisingly, often linked to political parties (della Porta and Vannucci 1997).9
9It is noted that companies that form political connections with government officials in order to obtain perks
or preferential treatment are characteristic not only of countries traditionally labeled as corrupt, but may also be found
in countries known for their transparent systems. In the US, about half of those who leave government jobs, including
some who have served in Congress, end up working as lobbyists, commanding a higher remuneration. Oftentimes,
as in Japan, they end up working for corporations that try to influence the decisions of government agencies they had
left. These examples demonstrate just how imperfectly political corruption is measured. Many countries that have no
corruption by bureaucrats and policemen, etc., nevertheless have politicians influenced by money spent on lobbying
and campaign contributions by interested groups and firms.
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It is evident that politically connected directors have the power and ability to
bring benefits to firms by influencing the laws under which their firms operate, as
well as increasing the possibility of winning government contracts for their firms
and, in the process, enhance firm value. Crudely put, politically connected board
members can either influence the transfer of wealth from competitors or consumers
to their firms (Faccio 2006) or corruptly extract economic rents from the firm for
their personal gain. We test the following null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: In the absence of political corruption, political connections of firms
have little or no effect on firm value.
The alternative to this hypothesis is that political connections of firms could
lead to private gains to the firms’ shareholders. In Singapore, offenses from and
sanctions on corruption are set out in the Prevention of Corruption Act, which is
vigilantly enforced. Punishment on corruption includes a fine of up to S$100,000 or
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years or both, in addition to other potential
related criminal charges. With such stringent regulations in place to uphold the
integrity of the business environment, it is therefore relatively difficult for directors
to corruptly exploit their connections to bring economic benefits to their firms or to
abuse their position in the firm for their own personal economic, social, or political
interests.
Thus, we hypothesize that firms are generally not expected to gain from their
political connections. However, firms operating in a more highly regulated industry
may deem it advantageous to appoint directors who are politically connected, but not
corrupt, to their board.10 A low-corruption government has two means of limiting
the value of political connections to firms. One, it is more likely to appoint, or allow
to be appointed, officials who are not corrupt onto corporate boards. Two, it would
set up mechanisms to identify and punish corrupt officials. The following hypothesis
is tested.
Hypothesis 2: Politically connected directors in firms operating in a more highly
regulated industry are associated with a higher firm value.
IV. Data and Methodology
A. Data and Sample Design
Underpricing during an IPO is a common phenomenon that is followed by
abnormally low returns in the long run (see Ritter 1991). IPOs allow us to investigate
10Highly regulated industries include those with oversight by a government department that requires the
company to make regular submissions on compliance issues, and have guidelines, standards, or legislation to meet.
These companies are required to fulfill certain compliance and licensing requirements set by a government authority.
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the wholesale introduction of all politically connected directors the first time the
firms are introduced to the capital market. The design eliminates the need to adjust
for the timing of an anticipation effect and the incremental value of a single appointee
in later years. Thus, IPOs provide an ex ante expectation of the effect of political
connection on firm value, while the value of political connections in seasoned firms
is captured in ex post pricing.
The IPOdata are obtained from the SecuritiesData Corporation (SDC)Global
New Issue database and cover all IPOs during 1998–2006. We use the SDC database
to obtain basic information on offer dates, offer prices, the number of shares issued,
net proceeds, and the number of lead and co-lead managers. Prior to the IPO,
we extract the latest financial information such as total assets, total liabilities, net
income, and the debt-to-asset ratio from the individual firms’ IPO prospectus. Post-
IPO, financial data such as total assets, current assets, current liabilities, long-term
debt, preferred stock, and market value of common equity are obtained from the
Thomson One Banker database. From the IPO prospectus, we obtain the profile of
each director. A total of 2,540 directors are covered in the sample of 387 listed
companies. We manually identify directors that are politically connected according
to the definition described in Section I.
Table 1 presents summary descriptive statistics of the entire sample of newly
listed companies. Panels A, B, and C contain their offer, firm, and corporate gover-
nance characteristics, respectively. On average, the sample firms offer 74.18 million
shares in their IPO, garnering net proceeds of $21.06million each.We note that firms
with political connection (PC firms) on average issue 63.6 million shares which is
less than those issued by non-PC firms. The median difference of these two numbers
is statistically significant at the 10% level. The net proceeds raised by PC firms also
tend to be lower than those of non-PC firms. The average offer price is $0.47 with
mean offer-to-close returns of 24%. On average, there are 1.33 underwriters per
issue.
Firm characteristics are described in Panel B. We note that the market value
of each firm’s equity averages $183.75 million with an average of 355.79 million
shares outstanding. PC firms have average total assets valued at $124.5 million
whereas the corresponding figure for non-PC firms is higher at $211.8 million. The
market value of PC firms at the time of IPO is also lower than that of non-PC firms.
In Panel C, we report that the management of PC firms on average own 44.5%
of their firms compared to 41% of non-PC firms. The average number of executive
directors among PC firms is 2.78 compared to 2.90 for non-PC firms. PC firms
report a significantly lower number of chairmen who also serve as CEOs than non-
PC firms. The average age of the directors is 46.6 years with those of PC firms being
slightly older. Overall, compared to non-PC firms, PC firms tend to be of a smaller
size with a higher degree of management ownership and have older directors.
The evidence from Table 1 shows that PC firms have a higher (though not
statistically significant) percentage of management ownership of the firm’s equity
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and are of a smaller size (again not statistically significant) in terms of IPO proceeds,
asset size, and market value at the time of IPO. Firms with such characteristics may
typically be expected to have a lower valuation compared to larger firms and those
that have a lower percentage ofmanagement ownership. However, the presence of PC
directors appears to have somewhat neutralized such effects with their association
with better corporate governance practices such as nonduality in chairman and CEO
positions and fewer executive directors.
The sample consists of 97 politically connected companies and 290 nonpo-
litically connected companies that are newly listed over a 9-year period from 1998
to 2006. This translates to 33.45% of the sample IPO companies that are deemed
to have political connection. In addition, from the profile of the 106 politically
connected directors identified in this study, we document in Table 2 that 89% of
these act as independent directors on the board. Moreover, 36% are current politi-
cal appointees, 91% are former political appointees, 13% are politically connected
chairmen, 22% are former cabinet ministers in the Singapore government, and 16%
are senior civil servants of Singapore. Members of the Parliament account for 89%
of politically connected directors. It is noted that current serving ministers are not
permitted to sit on corporate boards.
Table 3 presents the background of the politically connected directors, in-
cluding their age, business-related education, work experience, and the number of
outside directorships that they hold at and before the time of IPO. We note that
current (former) political appointees on corporate boards have worked a median
total of 24 (27) years, 11 (16) of which were spent in government or in the senior
civil service. This implies that politically connected directors have had a total of
11–13 years of business and professional experience which is not insignificant.11
Such experience may be attractive to firms operating in certain highly regulated
industries. In Table 3, we find that politically connected directors generally hold
multiple outside directorships indicating that they are busy board members.
B. Firm Valuation Using Tobin’s Q
Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the market value of a company’s assets (measured
by the market value of outstanding stock and debt) to the replacement costs of
the company’s assets, is an important and widely accepted measure of corporate
performance. As such, we make use of it as a proxy for firm value. It can be
approximated by:
Q = MV(CS) + BV(PS) + BV(CL) + BV(LTD) − BV(CA)
BV(TA)
(1)
11The corresponding background experience of directors of nonpolitically connected firms is not complete
nor consistently available. Thus, comparisons between the two types of firms cannot be properly made,
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Table 2. Types of Politically Connected Directors
No. of Directors No. of Firms
Types of Political Connection (%) (%)
Current political appointees 38 35
(36%) (36%)
Former political appointees 96 67
(91%) (69%)
Politically connected chairmen 14 14
(13%) (14%)
Politically connected independent directors 94 80
(89%) (82%)
Members of Parliament 94 81
(89%) (84%)
Current 37 31
(35%) (32%)
Former 34 30
(32%) (31%)
Former ministers 23 23
(22%) (24%)
Senior civil servants 17 17
(16%) (17%)
Current 1 1
(1%) (1%)
Former 16 16
(15%) (16%)
N 106 97
(100%) (100%)
Notes:
1. This table reports the number of directors and number of firms for different types of politically
connected directors based on 387 IPO firms from 1998 to 2006.
2. Current political appointees are those currently serving in government. Former political appointees
are those who previously served in government.
3. Politically connected chairmen and independent directors are those who are related to the government.
4. Members of Parliament (MPs) include directors who are current or former MPs elected as the peoples’
representative in the parliament.
5. Former ministers are directors who previously served in a cabinet position.
6. Senior civil servants include senior military personnel, permanent secretaries, and parliament
secretaries working in their respective ministries.
7. The percentage values in parentheses measure the ratios of each type of director to the total number
of politically connected directors or the ratios of each type of firm to the total number of politically
connected firms.
Source: Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issue database and IPO prospectus.
where MV(CS) is the market value of common shares, BV(PS) the book value of
preferred shares, BV(CL) the book value of current liabilities, BV(LTD) the book
value of long term debt, BV(CA) the book value of current assets, and BV(TA) the
book value of total assets. This simplified Q measure has been shown to account for
at least 96.6% of the variability of Tobin’s Q (Chung and Pruitt 1994). A Tobin’s
Q that is greater than one indicates that the company has a market value greater
than its recorded assets, which can be attributed to intellectual capital or positive
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market sentiment of the company. As such, a higher Tobin’s Q value is associated
with superior firm value.
We compute the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Specifically, we subtract the
industry median Tobin’s Q based on the two-digit SIC code from the sample firm’s
Tobin’s Q. By doing this, we are able to detect whether the sample firm outperforms
the industry and, at the same time, control for any industry-related biases.
C. Methodology
We employ both univariate and multivariate analyses to test our hypotheses.
We examine the association between firm value and political connection by perform-
ing linear regressions of Tobin’s Q for each of the 3 years after an IPO and for the
median of the 3 post-IPO years against alternative political connection definitions.
We run the following main regression:
Value = β0 + β1Polconnect + β2Duality + β3Independent + β4Dirage
+ β5Underpricing + β6Leverage + β7ROA + β8Exchange
+ β9GLC + β10Mktval + ε (2)
where the dependent variable, Value, refers to the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q of the
firm 1, 2, and 3 years after IPO listing and the median industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q
over the 3 years. Polconnect refers to political connection measured by the ratio of
the number of politically connected directors to the total number of board members.
Control variables used in the regression models are as follows. Duality refers
to the presence of a CEO who is also the chairman. Independent refers to the
percentage of directors on the board who are outside directors.Dirage is the average
age of directors.Underpricing is the offer-to-close return computed as the difference
between the first trading day’s closing and offer price as a percentage of the offer
price. Leverage is measured by the debt-to-asset ratio. ROA is the return on assets
computed as net income divided by total assets. Exchange is a dummy variable that
takes on the value of one if a firm is listed on the main board of the Singapore
Exchange (SGX) and zero otherwise. GLC is a dummy variable with a value of one
if it is a subsidiary of Temasek and zero otherwise.12 Mktval refers to the natural
logarithm of market value defined as the first day’s closing price multiplied by the
number of shares outstanding after the IPO.
12These are government-linked companies (GLC) in which Temasek Holdings, the investment holding arm
of the Singapore government, has at least a 20% stake. Examples of GLCs include some of the largest companies in
Singapore such as Singtel, DBS Bank, Singapore Airlines, PSA International, SMRT Corporation, Singapore Power,
and Neptune Oriental Lines. In our IPO sample, the GLC firms include Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing,
Singapore Airport Terminal Services, Singapore Post Ltd., Olam International Ltd., etc.
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In addition to the inclusion of several control variables, robustness checks are
performed using a number of alternative definitions of political connection. These
include using political connection as a dummy variable, which takes on the value
of one when at least one director is politically connected, and taking the natural
logarithm of the number of politically connected directors. Additionally, in place
of these variables, we employ dummy variables to reflect the status of directors as
current or former political appointees.
The control variables included in this study are supported by previous research
(e.g., Ang and Ding 2006, Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes 2006, Leuz and Oberholzer-
Gee 2006), and can be grouped into two categories. In the first category are firm-
specific control variables such as firm size, leverage, and profitability.13 These
include Mktval, which is the natural logarithm of a firm’s first day post-IPO market
value, used as a measure of firm size. Leverage is used as a proxy for mapping the
risk profile of a company. ROA is used to control for a firm’s profitability. The second
category includes control variables that capture differences in corporate governance
among the firms. A GLC dummy takes on a value of one when a company is
government-linked, and zero if otherwise. It is noted that GLCs have been shown
to provide superior returns (on both assets and equity) and are valued more highly
because of better management of expenses than non-GLCs (Ang and Ding 2006).14
In order to examine the effect of corporate governance on firm value while
considering a firm’s level of political connection, two variables are used as gover-
nance proxies: the percentage of independent directors and duality. Director inde-
pendence is an indicator of the presence of a strong and independent board, whereas
duality illustrates an appropriate balance of power, increased accountability, and
greater capacity of the board for independent decision making if the chairman and
CEO positions are held by separate persons. With an effective board, the oppor-
tunities for controlling shareholders and management to expropriate funds will,
hopefully, be reduced.
V. Results and Analysis
A. Univariate Analysis
Using independent t-tests and Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, we examine the
differences in means and medians, respectively, of the industry-adjusted Tobin’s
Q valuation for 1, 2, and 3 years after an IPO and the median industry-adjusted
Tobin’s Q over all 3 years after an IPO listing between politically connected firms
13We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that profitability be controlled for directly.
14Investors in the Singaporean market appear to value the higher standards of corporate governance found in
GLCs.
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Table 4. Firm Value in Post-IPO Years
Politically Connected Nonpolitically Connected Difference
1-year Mean 0.30 0.17 0.13
(0.75)
Median 0.10 0.09 0.01
(0.35)
N 61 199
2-year Mean 0.27 0.07 0.20
(0.77)
Median 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.43)
N 63 193
3-year Mean 0.46 0.21 0.25
(0.72)
Median 0.10 0.08 0.02
(0.53)
N 58 170
Post median Mean 0.23 0.08 0.15
(0.23)
Median –0.04 –0.002 –0.038
(–0.15)
N 48 154
∗= significance at the 10% level (two-tailed test), ∗∗= significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test),
∗∗∗= significance at the 1% level (two-tailed test), IPO = initial public offering.
Notes:
1. This table reports the mean and median of the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for politically and non-
politically connected firms in the post-IPO years, specifically, 1, 2, and 3 years after an IPO. Post
median refers to the median industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for all three post-IPO periods.
2. Tobin’s Q is computed based on the Chung and Pruitt (1994) method as follows
Q = MV (CS) + BV (PS) + BV (CL) + BV (LT D) − BV (CA)
BV (T A)
where MV(CS) is the market value of common shares, BV(PS) the book value of preferred shares,
BV(CL) the book value of current liabilities, BV(LTD) the book value of long term debt, BV(CA)
the book value of current assets, and BV(TA) the book value of total assets.
3. We compute the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q by subtracting the industry median from the sample firm’s
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.
4. t-statistics and z-statistics based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test (the figures in parentheses) were used
for the test of differences in the mean and median, respectively.
Source: Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issue and Thomson One Banker databases.
and those that are not politically connected. The findings for industry-adjusted
Tobin’s Q valuation are presented in Table 4, which shows that the industry-adjusted
Tobin’s Q is not statistically significant between the two groups. This suggests that
there is insufficient evidence to show that political connection adds to firm value
in Singapore and that any benefits that such connections might bring appear to be
limited, supporting Hypothesis 1 above.
In place of Tobin’s Q, the results for cumulative abnormal stock returns (the
difference between daily returns andmarket returns) of politically and nonpolitically
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Table 5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Post-IPO Years
Politically Connected Nonpolitically Connected Difference
1-year Mean –0.17 –0.20 0.03
(0.55)
Median –0.24 –0.20 –0.04
(–0.49)
N 75 234
2-year Mean –0.35 –0.33 –0.02
(–0.16)
Median –0.52 –0.48 –0.04
(–0.20)
N 54 195
3-year Mean –0.51 –0.44 –0.07
(–0.67)
Median –0.65 –0.72 0.07
(0.91)
N 34 129
∗= significance at the 10% level (two-tailed test), ∗∗= significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test),
∗∗∗= significance at the 1% level (two-tailed test), IPO = initial public offering.
Notes:
1. This table reports themean andmedian of the cumulative abnormal returns for politically and nonpolitically
connected firms in the post-IPO years. Specifically, we compute the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for
1, 2, and 3 years after an IPO.
2. The abnormal return is the difference between the daily returns and the market returns. The market return
is computed based on the Singapore Straits Times Index (STI).
3. t-statistics and z-statistics based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test (the figures in parentheses) were used for
the test of differences in the mean and median, respectively.
Source: Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issue database and Datastream.
connected firms for 1, 2, and 3 years after an IPO are shown in Table 5. The mean
and median values show that abnormal stock returns of politically connected firms
do not outperform those of nonpolitically connected firms up to 3 years after an IPO
as both the results of the t-test and Wilcoxon signed ranks test are not statistically
significant. Again, our evidence does not support shareholders having benefitted
from the appointment of politically connected directors.
We examine the differences in accounting performance of the politically
connected and unconnected firms and report the median values of the profit margin,
cash flows from operations, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and
return on invested capital (ROIC) for 1, 2, and 3 years after the IPO and for median
for the 3 years in Table 6. In general, from the results in Panel A, we do not find
any significant differences in the accounting performance between the two types of
firms. However, if we limit the sample to the more regulated industries, the results
in Panel B show that the profit margin and cash flow from operations in the 1-year
post-IPO period is significantly higher among PC firms than non-PC firms. These
findings indicate that politically connected directors are associated with indicators
of profitability and firm value within the first year of an IPO among firms that are
more highly regulated.
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Table 6. Accounting Performance of Politically and Nonpolitically Connected IPOs
Politically Nonpolitically Wilcoxon Signed
Connected Connected Ranks Test
Panel A: Full Sample
Profit margin 1-year 7.395 7.930 0.783
2-year 5.695 4.935 0.826
3-year 4.645 3.960 0.633
Post median 5.970 5.480 0.661
Cash flow from operations 1-year 1.905 1.930 0.468
2-year 2.560 2.235 1.411
3-year 2.440 2.130 0.430
Post median 1.780 1.665 0.041
ROA 1-year 8.760 7.850 0.430
2-year 5.730 6.390 –0.495
3-year 4.745 5.080 –0.287
Post median 4.940 5.525 –0.537
ROE 1-year 14.600 13.030 0.577
2-year 9.640 10.555 0.181
3-year 7.675 7.930 0.076
Post median 7.940 8.480 0.046
ROIC 1-year 11.720 10.365 0.190
2-year 7.920 8.010 –0.502
3-year 5.950 7.480 –0.554
Post median 6.920 7.675 –0.692
Panel B: Regulated Industries
Profit margin 1-year 4.700 2.970 1.603∗
2-year 1.688 –0.198 0.908
3-year –0.063 0.135 0.131
Post median 0.766 0.290 0.597
Cash flows from operations 1-year 4.950 –1.965 2.013∗∗
2-year 0.298 –1.668 0.908
3-year –1.450 –1.743 0.090
Post median –1.160 –1.620 0.682
ROA 1-year 4.663 2.730 0.686
2-year 1.680 –0.090 0.528
3-year –0.230 –0.850 0.475
Post median 0.694 –0.188 0.203
ROE 1-year 3.265 0.588 0.881
2-year 3.420 –1.545 0.979
3-year 1.145 –4.890 1.247
Post median 2.585 –2.085 1.116
Continued.
B. Multivariate Analysis
The initial results (not reported) of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
using industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (a proxy for firm value for each of the 3 years and
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Table 6. Continued.
Politically Nonpolitically Wilcoxon Signed
Connected Connected Ranks Test
ROIC 1-year 3.495 2.960 0.227
2-year 1.290 –1.380 0.825
3-year –0.108 –2.843 1.030
Post median 0.410 –0.734 0.475
∗= significance at the 10% level (two-tailed test), ∗∗= significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test), ∗∗∗= significance
at the 1% level (two-tailed test), IPO = initial public offering, ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity,
ROIC = return on invested capital.
Notes:
1. This table reports the median values of the accounting variables for politically and nonpolitically connected firms
in the post-IPO years, specifically, 1, 2, and 3 years after an IPO.
2. Post median refers to the median for all three post-IPO periods.
3. z-statistics based onWilcoxon signed ranks test were used for the median test between politically and nonpolitically
connected firms.
Source: Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issue and Thomson One Banker databases.
the median of the 3 years after an IPO listing) as the key dependent variable show
that political connection, which is expressed as a percentage of politically connected
directors on the board, does not have a strong predictive power in explaining firm
value. Political connection is found to be not statistically significant in explaining
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q over various years. We therefore cannot reject Hypoth-
esis 1 that political connection is not associated with firm value. Similar results (not
reported) are obtained when the political connection percentage variable is replaced
by a political connection dummy variable and the natural logarithm of the number
of politically connected directors.
However, upon further investigation, when we break down the sample ac-
cording to the two-digit SIC, we find that, in certain industries, political connection
appears to be more important than in others. These are the industries that tend
to be subject to more stringent government regulation such as electrical and elec-
tronic equipment (SIC 36), holding and other investment offices (SIC 67), general
building contractors (SIC 15), food and kindred products (SIC 20), and rubber and
miscellaneous plastics products (SIC 30).15
The findings for these industries show that the interaction between political
connection and a particular regulated industry are mostly positively significant
at the 10% level (see Model 2 of AQ_post2yr and AQ_median in Table 7). As
these industries carry higher regulatory risks—e.g., not knowing the appropriate
regulations, their interpretation, and/or procedures to observe them—PC directors
may help firms alleviate/mitigate these risks by providing the appropriate advice
15Industries that are subject to a more stringent regulatory environment include: electronic and electronic
equipment (SIC36),which is governed by the InfocommAuthority of Singapore’s ElectronicTransactionsAct; holding
and other investment offices (SIC 67), which is regulated by the various securities and financial acts of the Monetary
Authority of Singapore; general building contractors (SIC 15), regulated by the Building and Construction Authority;
food and kindred products (SIC 20), by the Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority; and rubber and miscellaneous
plastics products (SIC 30), by the Rubber Association of Singapore.
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while being mindful of any potential conflicts of interests. Our results reveal that
companies operating in these industries have a positive and significant addition to
their firm value due to their political connection based on the 3-year median post-
IPO industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. The results using abnormal stock returns (Table 8)
largely corroborate those of the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.
Given the existence of stringent laws (namely the Prevention of Corruption
Act) that are strictly enforced with its attendant criminal and civil penalties against
corruption in Singapore, together with the country’s high ranking in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, it is highly probable that any corrupt
official will be very quickly brought to task. As documented earlier, since PC
directors are associatedwith better governance practices, their presence on corporate
boards may compel firms to better adhere to the appropriate regulations. We are not
claiming that PC firms do not receive government contracts or any preferential
treatment. Rather, by virtue of their being perceived as having good governance
under a low corruption environment where government regulations are observed,
such companies are likely to be attractive to both private businesses and governments
for suitable business alliances. Our findings provide evidence that it is possible for
political connection to be independent of corruption.
The results for governance show that Duality is negatively and significantly
related to industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in the second year post-IPO, whereas Indepen-
dent is positive and significant for the median industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in the 3
years after an IPO.Dirage is negative and significant for the 1-year industry-adjusted
Tobin’s Q post IPO. We also investigate the interaction effect between political con-
nection and two governance variables (duality and board independence) and find
insignificant results (not reported). This implies that there is insufficient evidence
to show that politically connected firms in a low corruption environment, regardless
of their corporate governance, reduce firm values. To lend further support to our
findings, we include an additional interactive term between political connection and
GLC (to reflect the presence of government ownership in a firm) into our multivari-
ate regression. The results from this interactive term are found to be not statistically
significant.
For greater robustness of our results, we have allowed for finer classifications
of political connection (see Table 2). That is, we further divide these PC directors into
the following: politically connected chairmen/CEOs, current political appointees,
former political appointees, MPs, former ministers, and senior civil servants. The
regression results (Tables 9 and 10) for each type of political connection show that
such connections add little to firm value.
In Tables 9 and 10, besides investigating the value effects of different political
connection classifications, we include a dummy variable (Reg Ind) that represents
the five regulated industries identified in Table 7 to have a significant contribution
to the value of firms with PC directors.
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Table 11. Board Composition of Regulated Industries
Politically
Connected
Nonpolitically
Connected Difference
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Board size 6.697 7.000 6.891 6.000 −0.194 1.000
Duality 0.455 0.000 0.598 1.000 −0.143 −1.000
Independent directors 2.394 2.000 2.424 2.000 −0.030 0.000
Independent directors/board size 0.363 0.333 0.360 0.333 0.003 0.000
Executive directors 2.879 3.000 3.239 3.000 −0.360 0.000
Executive directors/board size 0.440 0.400 0.461 0.500 −0.021 −0.100
Director age 48.167 48.000 46.500 46.000 1.667 2.000∗∗
Management ownership 0.409 0.330 0.393 0.343 0.016 −0.013
GLC 0.030 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.009 0.000
∗ = significance at the 10% level (two-tailed test), ∗∗ = significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test), ∗∗∗ = significance
at the 1% level (two-tailed test), GLC = government-linked corporation.
Notes:
1. This table reports the descriptive statistics of board composition for politically connected and nonpolitically
connected firms in the more highly regulated industries.
2. More highly regulated industries include electrical and electronic equipment (SIC 36), holding and other investment
offices (SIC 67), general building contractors (SIC 15), food and kindred products (SIC 20), and rubber and
miscellaneous plastics products (SIC 30).
3. t-statistics and z-statistics based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test were used to test for mean and median differences,
respectively.
Source: Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issue database and IPO prospectus.
We find from the Tobin’s Q results in Table 9 that firms with politically
connected chairmen or CEOs are associated with a significant positive value effect.
From Table 10, senior civil servants contribute to a significant positive abnormal
return 3 years post-IPO. All other forms of political connection have either very
weak or no impact on firm value.
Further analysis of the five regulated industries (see Table 11) reveals that,
compared to firms that have no political connection within the same industries,
PC firms have a smaller board size, less occurrence of duality in the chairman
and CEO functions, a larger independent directors-to-board-size ratio, a smaller
percentage of executive directors, slightly older directors, a larger percentage of
management ownership, and a higher proportion ofGLCs. These differences, though
not statistically significant, provide anecdotal evidence of the composition of PC
boards.
We further investigate the impact fromamajor event—a change in Singapore’s
Code of Corporate Governance, issued 14 July 2005, requiring all listed companies
to disclose their corporate governance practices and explain deviations from the
Code in their annual reports for annual general meetings held from 1 January 2007
onwards. Our results on the announcement effect reveal that PC directors do not
add value to their firms both before and after the imposition of the new disclosure
requirement. However, as shown in Table 12, after controlling for the presence of PC
directors, firms in the more highly regulated industries appear to have a statistically
significant impact on firm value as measured by the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.
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Table 12. Regression Analysis under the New Corporate Governance Code
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Full Period Pre-event Post-event
Intercept 5.553∗∗ 4.979∗ 0.026
(2.01) (1.64) (0.01)
Polconnect 0.841 0.767 1.892
(1.20) (1.07) (0.63)
Duality −0.190 −0.264∗ 0.433
(–1.32) (–1.89) (1.17)
Independent 0.210 0.382 0.584
(0.35) (0.63) (0.26)
Dirage −1.758∗∗∗ −1.533∗∗ −1.172
(–2.63) (–2.19) (–0.92)
Underpricing 0.070 −0.072 1.585∗∗∗
(0.48) (–0.45) (5.30)
Leverage 0.002∗∗∗ −0.468 0.001
(3.31) (–1.34) (1.08)
Exchange 0.019 −0.074 −0.594
(0.14) (–0.53) (–1.51)
GLC −0.161 −0.024 −1.993∗∗∗
(–0.73) (–0.14) (–3.51)
Market Value 0.121∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.363∗∗
(2.06) (2.05) (2.27)
Reg Ind 0.048 −0.026 1.024∗∗
(0.39) (–0.21) (1.96)
Event −0.102 – –
(–0.41)
Adj. R2 0.027 0.022 0.123
F-Statistic 1.63∗ 1.50 1.39
N 252 223 29
∗ = significance at the 10% level (two-tailed test), ∗∗ = significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test), ∗∗∗ = significance
at the 1% level (two-tailed test) using White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics.
Notes:
1. This table presents the regression results for the abnormal firm value during the pre-event and post-event. The
event is the new corporate governance code adopted in 14 July 2005.
2. The industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is measured by the sample firm’s Tobin’s Q minus the industry median Tobin’s Q.
The industry classification is based on the 2-digit SIC code.
3. The dependent variable AQ_post1yr is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q a year after an IPO.
4. The independent variables were defined as follows.
• Polconnect is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the director is politically connected, 0 otherwise. It is
proxied by politically connected chairmen/CEOs, current political appointees, former political appointees,
members of Parliament, former ministers, and senior civil servants in Models 1 to 6.
• Duality occurs when the chairman is also the CEO.
• Independent is the percentage of independent directors on the board.
• Dirage is the average age of the firm’s directors.
• Underpricing is computed as the difference between the first day’s closing price and offer price, computed as a
percentage of the offer price.
• Leverage is total debt divided by total assets.
• Exchange is a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if the firm is listed on the main board of the SGX, 0
otherwise.
• GLC is a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if the firm is a government-linked corporation, 0 otherwise.
• Market Value is the first day’s closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after the IPO.
• Reg Ind is a dummy variable representing themore highly regulated industries including electrical and electronic
equipment (SIC 36), holding and other investment offices (SIC 67), general building contractors (SIC 15),
food and kindred products (SIC 20), and rubber and miscellaneous plastics products (SIC 30).
• Event is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO was issued under the new corporate governance
code regime (14 July 2005), 0 otherwise.
Source: Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issue database, IPO prospectus, Thomson One Banker
database, and Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2005.
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We provide results of a logistic regression in Table 13 to reflect the demand
for politically connected directors. The coefficient for director age is found to
be positively significant. This means that PC firms have directors that are more
experienced in guiding their firms than non-PC firms. PC firms also appear to have
stronger corporate governance as evidenced by their lower likelihood of duality in
their chairman and CEO functions and a smaller percentage of executive directors.
On the whole, the results show that, in Singapore, political connection in a
non-corrupt regime in general does not affect firmvalue. However, firms in industries
that are more highly regulated appear to receive some benefit in terms of higher firm
valuation from their political connections. In particular, companies with a politically
connected chairman/CEO or senior civil servant on their board benefit the most in
terms of a positive effect on firm value. PC firms, by virtue of their being perceived
as having good governance under a low corruption environment where government
regulations are followed, such companiesmay be attractive business partners to other
businesses and governments.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Political connection is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, firm value
can be jeopardized if exploiting such connections distorts incentives, misallocates
investment, and increases the extent of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). On
the other hand, politically connected companies may benefit through easier access
to debt financing, lower taxes, and stronger market power (Faccio 2006). Although
the effect of political connections has been previously investigated, our contribution
is to examine for the first time the impact of politically connected directors on the
value of firms operating in an environment where the perceived level of corruption is
comparatively low due to better institutions and not confounded by favorable social
and cultural factors. Singapore is ideal for the study as it is not only among the
countries with the lowest level of corruption, but it is also free of confounding factors
such as an innate culture among countries with the lowest political corruption. We
study this issue at a firm’s inception (i.e., at IPO), where most of the new politically
connected directors are appointed at the same time and their impact, if any, has not
been anticipated as would be the case at any arbitrary time after an IPO.
We study the effect of political connection on the value of a company in a
low political corruption environment by examining the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q
and the excess returns of newly-listed companies from 1998 to 2006. Firm value,
within 3 years from the issue of an IPO, is found largely to be independent of a firm’s
political connection, even after controlling for differences in corporate governance
and firm characteristics. Importantly, such connections do not reduce firm value.
However, when the sample is broken down in terms of industry, we find that firms
operating in a more highly regulated environment appear to receive some benefit
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Table 13. Logistic Regression Results of Politically Connected Directors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 2.129 −0.273 −0.081
Market Value −0.193 −0.236 −0.253
ROA −0.043 −0.065 −0.073
Leverage −0.012∗ −0.011 −0.014∗
Underpricing 0.114 0.273 0.324
GLC 0.295 0.116 0.181
Exchange 0.063 0.478 0.503
Board Size −0.124 −0.128
Duality −0.538∗ −0.589∗
Dirage 0.087∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
Independent −0.106 −0.041
IO −0.005 −0.005
Industry1 −0.011
Industry2 −0.316
Industry3 0.395
Industry4 −0.584
Industry5 0.551
Industry6 0.740
Industry7 0.215
Industry8 0.234
Industry9 0.026
Industry10 −1.639
Cox & Snell R2 0.017 0.077 0.101
−2 Log Likelihood 407.62 304.89 297.34
N 429 429 429
∗ = significance at the 10% level (two-tailed test), ∗∗ = significance at the 5% level (two-tailed
test), ∗∗∗ = significance at the 1% level (two-tailed test) using Wald z-statistics.
Notes:
1. This table presents the results of the demand for politically connected directors. The dependent
variable is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO is politically connected and
0 otherwise.
2. The independent variables were defined as follows:
• Market Value is the first day’s closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after
the IPO.
• ROA is the return on assets prior to the IPO.
• Leverage is total debt divided by total assets.
• Underpricing is computed as the difference between the first day’s closing price and offer price,
computed as a percentage of the offer price.
• GLC is a dummy variable taking on the value of one if the firm is a government-linked
corporation and zero if otherwise.
• Exchange is a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if the firm is listed on the main board
of the SGX, 0 otherwise.
• Board Size is the total number of board members.
• Duality occurs when the chairman is also the CEO.
• Dirage is the average age of the firm’s directors.
• Independent is the percentage of independent directors on the board.
• IO is the institutional ownership of the IPO.
• Industry 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the 2-digit
SIC codes are 36, 67, 73, 87, 28, 15, 20, 30, 50, and 35, respectively; 0 otherwise.
Source: Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issue database and IPO prospectus.
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from their political connection in terms of a higher firm valuation, especially among
those with a politically connected chairman/CEO or senior civil servant on their
board. As PC directors have been shown to be associated with better governance
practices, their presence on corporate boards may thus compel firms to better adhere
to government regulations. Thus, because PC firms are perceived as having good
governance under a low corruption environment and strictly observe government
regulations, other firms and governments may be attracted to forming business
relationships with them.
We find that firms with politically connected directors are associated with
good governance practices such as nonduality in their chairman and CEO and fewer
executive directors. We show that PC firms have higher managerial ownership and
tend to be smaller than non-PC firms. Firms with such characteristics may typically
be expected to have a lower valuation compared to those that are larger or have
a lower percentage of management ownership. Our results show that the presence
of PC directors appears to have somewhat neutralized any negative effects with its
association with better corporate governance. Thus, having a politically connected
director on the board may be used as a signal by a firm to investors that it is subject to
adequate appropriate monitoring mechanisms. As the supply of good candidates for
outside independent directors is often limited, firms would be inclined to invite such
“politicians” to serve on their board, not because of their political connections and
potential economic payoffs but as a means of expanding their list of good candidates
for independent directors.
In conclusion, the findings of this study suggest that, despite the lack of strong
economic value that political connection per se brings to firms, politically connected
directors may still contribute to the firm when they serve as independent directors
within a noncorrupt political environment. We provide evidence that companies in
certain highly regulated industries may find that having certain types of directors
who are politically connected could have a positive and significant impact on their
firm’s value.
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